Georgetown University Law Center

Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW

2009

Economies of Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace Assumptions
Rebecca Tushnet
Georgetown University Law Center, rlt26@law.georgetown.edu

This paper can be downloaded free of charge from:
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/22

51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 513 (2009)
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the Law and Economics Commons

GEORGETOWN LAW
Faculty Publications

November 2009

Economies of Desire:
Fair Use and Marketplace Assumptions
51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 513 (2009)
Rebecca Tushnet
Professor of Law
Georgetown University Law Center
rlt26@law.georgetown.edu
This paper can be downloaded without charge from:
Scholarly Commons: http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/22/
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1498542
Posted with permission of the author

ECONOMIES OF DESIRE: FAIR USE AND MARKETPLACE
ASSUMPTIONS

REBECCA TUSHNET*
ABSTRACT
At the moment that “incentives” for creation meet “preferences” for
the same, the economic account of copyright loses its explanatory
power. This piece explores the ways in which the desire to create can
be excessive, beyond rationality, and free from the need for economic
incentive. Psychological and sociological concepts can do more to
explain creative impulses than classical economics. As a result, a
copyright law that treats creative activity as a product of economic
incentives can miss the mark and harm what it aims to promote. The
idea of abundance—even overabundance—in creativity can help
define the proper scope of copyright law, especially in fair use. I
explore these ideas by examining how creators think about what they
do. As it turns out, commercially and critically successful creators
resemble creators who avoid the general marketplace and create
unauthorized derivative works (fanworks). The role of love, desire,
and other passions in creation has lessons for the proper aims of
copyright, the meaning of fair use, and conceptions of exploitation in
markets.

* Professor, Georgetown Law. Thanks to Jessica Silbey and participants at the William
& Mary conference on the Boundaries of Intellectual Property.
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INTRODUCTION
As the Supreme Court has explained, “[t]he economic philosophy
behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and
copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort
by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through
the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’”1
But if that economic philosophy is only partially correct as an
empirical matter, the implications for copyright are substantial.
Copyright’s incentive model largely bypasses a persuasive account
of creativity that emphasizes a desire for creation, grounded in
artists’ own experiences of creation.
At the moment that “incentives” for creation meet “preferences”
for the same, the economic account of copyright loses its explanatory
power. This piece explores the ways in which the desire to create
can be excessive, beyond rationality, and free from the need for
economic incentive. Psychological and sociological concepts can do
more to explain creative impulses than classical economics. As a
result, a copyright law that treats creativity as a product of
economic incentives can miss the mark and harm what it aims to
promote. The idea of abundance—even overabundance—in creativity can help define the proper scope of copyright law, especially in
fair use. I explore these ideas by examining how creators think
about what they do. As it turns out, commercially and critically
successful creators resemble creators who avoid the general
marketplace and create unauthorized derivative works (fanworks)
when they talk about why and how they create.2 Their similarities
in motivation and inspiration help explain why exclusive rights
must be carefully limited if we are to achieve the creativity to which
a free and vibrant society aspires.
Several notes of caution are in order: First, though my discussion
here focuses on creators’ own accounts of their creative processes, I
am not arguing that creative impulses exist in isolation from social
structures, any more than creators themselves do. Rather, the individual reports of how creativity is experienced as unpredictable,
1. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
2. See infra Part II.A-B.
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tyrannical, obsessive, and joyful are consistent with the thesis that
creativity arises from unplanned and stochastic encounters with
the world around us.3 One reason that economic narratives are so
limited is that they cannot tell us how preferences to create are
shaped, nourished, or crushed by the social structures that inevitably frame all human interaction.
Second, I am not arguing that extrinsic incentives are irrelevant or disrespectable, whether they are monetary or nonmonetary
(reputation is probably the most common nonmonetary extrinsic
motivation dissected in the literature on copyright and creativity).4
Incentives do matter, especially for intermediaries—a topic to which
I will return—and even if they didn’t, the availability of rewards,
some of which are generated by copyright, would still affect the
extent to which some creators could afford to satisfy their preferences to create. What I aim to do is draw attention to the lived
experience of many creators, which is (and always has been) richer
and messier than the language of incentive can accommodate.
Desire, love, pleasure: these are concepts we need to theorize
creatively, even if the law has difficulty accommodating them. Once
we recognize that copyright’s abstract incentive story bears little
relationship to the reality of much creative practice, we can better
appreciate what copyright can, and cannot, do for authors.
Part I briefly canvasses the standard economic incentive-based
story of copyright and a few of its discontents. Part II offers some
thicker accounts of creative experience, focusing on creativity as a
need that, like love, often strengthens as it becomes more familiar.
Desire, not calculation, drives much creative practice. Part III looks
at a few implications for copyright doctrine, including fair use,
where questions of passionate response to existing works often get
addressed.

3. See generally Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1151 (2007) (arguing that creativity emerges from a cultural landscape of
encounters not reducible either to economic or rights-based theories of the genesis of creative
work).
4. See infra note 18.
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I. THE OFFICIAL STORY: “NO MAN BUT A BLOCKHEAD EVER WROTE,
EXCEPT FOR MONEY”5
Justices of the Supreme Court, like most lawyers, are formally
committed to copyright’s incentive story, which is elegant and
simple: “copyright law serves public ends by providing individuals
with an incentive to pursue private ones.”6 Prominent academic
accounts of copyright law likewise accept and elaborate on incentive
theory to explain why authors create.7 At its extreme, incentive
theory posits that maximum incentives require maximum control:
The fundamental premise of our copyright law is that the best
way to encourage the creation of valuable works is to let authors
capture the market value of those works. This means that even
if we don’t want to give the Dr. Seusses of the world power to
enjoin uses that offend them, we do want to protect their ability
to share in all the profits that their work gives rise to.8

There are a number of problems with this account even on its own
terms. One of the biggest is that rights don’t mean payment. There
is little hard evidence about the relationship between copyright
and creativity. What empirical evidence exists does not engender
5. JAMES BOSWELL, 3 BOSWELL’S LIFE OF JOHNSON 19 (G. Hill ed., 1934), quoted in
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994).
6. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 n.18 (2003); see also Harper & Row Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422
U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
7. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright
Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 331-32 (1989); Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement
in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 993 (1997).
8. Alex Kozinski & Christopher Newman, What’s So Fair About Fair Use?, 46 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 513, 524 (1999) (emphasis added). Shyamkrishna Balganesh
summarizes this line of reasoning:
[Copyright’s] purpose lies solely in encouraging creativity .... [T]he incentive
provided by copyright’s promise of exclusivity is also thought to correlate directly
with the overall production of creative expression.... The linear conception thus
implies that there exists “no good reason” within the very idea of incentives (the
model’s only frame of reference) for “why copyrights should not cover everything
and last forever.”
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1569,
1579 (2009) (quoting Jessica Litman, War Stories, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 337, 344
(2002)).
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confidence that increases in copyright protection spur creativity.9
A significant factor in this failure of incentive is that, regardless of
the strength of protection, it is the likelihood of success in the
market—a highly unpredictable variable, and one that law can do
little if anything to affect—that is key to whether new authors reap
rewards from creating works.10
Separately, Mark Lemley and Brett Frischmann, among others,
have compellingly criticized the extreme control-everything version
of copyright theory. Positive externalities or “spillovers” and free
riding are a pervasive, beneficial, and necessary part of markets of
all sorts, including intellectual property markets.11
I will not restate these objections here. My aim is to show how
easily, using the language of economics, monetary incentives come
to be labeled both necessary and sufficient for creativity. For
example, reacting to the explosion of uncompensated, uncontrolled
creativity on the Internet, Robert Merges proposes to protect that
creativity by adding property rights.12 In this account, people are
acting against their best interests, failing to notice that the
proper incentive structure is not in place. The current level of
9. See, e.g., Raymond Shih Ray Ku et al., Does Copyright Law Promote Creativity?
An Empirical Analysis of Copyright’s Bounty 4 (Case Research Paper Series in Legal
Studies, Working Paper No. 09-20, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1410824
(“[S]tatistically, there is no uniform or fully predictable relationship between laws that
increase copyright term, subject matter, rights, or criminal penalties and the number of new
works registered in general.... [T]he data suggest[ ] that these relationships may be essentially
random.... So while increasing copyright protection may increase the rewards available to
authors, it does little to change their incentives overall.”).
10. See Jessica Litman, The Copyright Revision Act of 2026, 13 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L.
REV. 249, 252 (2009) (“In the real copyright system, though, writers, artists, musicians, and
filmmakers face daunting obstacles in searching for opportunities to write, paint, play, or film
anything the public will see.... Even when creators succeed in publishing a book, cutting an
album, placing an article, or selling a screenplay, ... they typically earn only a small share of
the proceeds of the copyright in their work.”); Ku et al., supra note 9, at 33-34.
11. Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257 (2007).
12. Robert P. Merges, Locke for the Masses: Property Rights and the Products of Collective
Creativity, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1179, 1880, 1882 (2009) (proposing “awarding some form of
intellectual property (‘IP’) to large groups of dispersed creators” because “[t]his form of effort
is not well-accounted for in our legal system” and “labor ought to be rewarded with a property
right”). Though one could read this as a rights-based account, Merges makes clear that his
framework is economic. See id. at 1184 (“Individual control of economic assets as a general
organizing principle makes as much sense when those assets are digital as when they are
industrial or agricultural.... As far as we can tell, for the most part individual ownership and
control are as important now as ever.”).
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nonpropertized creativity is simply an anomaly, one that would be
better served by being brought within copyright’s control.13
Other economically-minded copyright reform proposals partake
of the same monetary-incentive-based assumptions. Judge Alex
Kozinski, an influential judicial voice on intellectual property
matters, and Christopher Newman have proposed to minimize
injunctions in copyright cases by (1) eliminating the fair use doctrine in cases of unauthorized derivative works, but (2) instead of
granting injunctions, requiring parodists and other fair users to
share the profits attributable to the use of the original’s copyrighted
elements.14 They argue that there should be no difference in the
treatment of unauthorized commercial and noncommercial works.15
Yet their solution requires, as a baseline assumption, that profits
will routinely be available. If many unauthorized derivative works
are noncommercial and there is no money to pay the copyright
owner, those works will be suppressed.16
13. Id.
14. See Kozinski & Newman, supra note 8, at 525-26. As Jonathan Fox notes, Kozinski
and Newman, in perhaps their most triumphant assertion of law-and-economics reasoning
over reality, worry that fair use law “does not maximize utility since it fails to give authors
and publishers any incentive to produce the kinds of famous works that inspire parody.”
Jonathan M. Fox, The Fair Use Commercial Parody Defense and How To Improve It, 46
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 619, 638 (2006) (citing Kozinski & Newman, supra note 8, at 525); see
also Kozinski & Newman, supra note 8, at 525 (“[P]eople do write with the goal of being
parodied, indirectly—because they write with the goal of becoming the kind of success that
attracts parody. The value of those parodies, therefore, ought to be reflected somehow in the
original author’s compensation.... By rewarding [publishers] for publishing writers whose
works are popular enough to spawn parody, we give them the means to find and support other
potentially valuable writers as well.”). Given that authors and publishers routinely think
more of their productions than the rest of the world does, this reasoning is not incentive-based
so much as it relies on what Mark Lemley criticizes as a naïve theory of “if value, then right.”
Mark A. Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 CAL. L. REV. 521, 533 n.49 (2003).
15. Kozinski & Newman, supra note 8, at 528 (discussing noncommercially motivated
publishers, though only in the context of ideologically motivated participants in a commercial
marketplace; arguing that there should be no difference between commercial and
noncommercial works in assessing infringement).
16. See id. at 525 (injunctions should only be granted when damages would be
“inadequate”); id. at 526 (proposing to award a proportion of fair users’ profits, or damages
to the copyright owner’s profits); id. at 527 (proposing no award unless there are profits or
damages, which means that “commercial publishers” would only infringe when it was
efficient). In fact, the presumptions and burdens of proof they propose would put noncommercial creators—unlikely to be represented by counsel—at significant risk:
If you want to make pornographic cartoons starring Mickey Mouse, you’d better
be sure you can convince a court that this constitutes critical evaluation of
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What about individual variations in creativity? No matter how
much money J.K. Rowling makes, very few people have the ability
to write the next Harry Potter series. The conventional theory treats
capacities and motivations to create as exogenous variables—tastes,
or preferences, which affect individual responsiveness to copyright’s
incentives, but are otherwise not amenable to analysis.17
Even prominent proponents of limiting copyright have focused
more on ways in which nonmonetary incentives can replace money
than on creators’ perspectives on the sources of inspiration and
spurs to creativity.18 As Tom Bell suggests, economically minded
theorists interested in nonmonetary incentives have remained
largely uninterested in thicker accounts of creative motivation: “We
need not specify what motivates ... authors [who share their works
for free or for nominal prices] .... We need only observe that ... nonmonetary incentives sometimes suffice to inspire authorship.”19
Copyright restrictionists have given most attention to the ways
in which monetary incentives can compete with and crowd out
certain important nonmonetary incentives.20 But incentives are
Disney’s work. If not, you’ll be liable for any damages Disney can prove, and
subject to injunction if it looks like you can’t pay up.
Id. at 529.
17. Note, Designing the Public Domain, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1498 (2009) (“Most
economic analyses of information production and regulation account for intrinsic motivation
by assuming that it is ‘an exogenously given constant’ and may thus be disregarded.” (quoting
Bruno S. Frey & Reto Jegen, Motivation Crowding Theory, 15 J. ECON. SURVEYS 589, 591
(2001))). For a good summary of the way in which conventional economic theory sets
preferences aside as exogenous, see Matthew A. Edwards, The FTC and New Paternalism, 60
ADMIN. L. REV. 323, 325-27 (2008).
18. See, e.g., JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND
189 (2008) (“Assume a random distribution of incentive structures in different people ... [I]t
just does not matter why they do it. In lots of cases, they will do it. One person works for love
of the species, another in the hope of a better job, a third for the joy of solving puzzles, and a
fourth because he has to solve a particular problem anyway for his own job and loses nothing
by making his hack available for all. Each person has their own reserve price, the point at
which they say, ‘Now I will turn off Survivor and go and create something.’”); Greg Lastowka,
Digital Attribution: Copyright and the Right to Credit, 87 B.U. L. REV. 41, 42, 58 (2007)
(arguing that copyright law should be reconfigured to support reputation-based incentives as
well as monetary incentives) [hereinafter Lastowka, Digital Attribution].
19. Tom W. Bell, The Specter of Copyism v. Blockheaded Authors: How User-Generated
Content Affects Copyright Policy, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 841, 851 (2008).
20. See, e.g., YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 92-96 (2006) (discussing the effects of different
incentives and summarizing evidence of crowding out); John Quiggin & Dan Hunter, Money
Ruins Everything, 30 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT L.J. 203, 214-15 (2008) (“[A]mateur creators do
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still dominant, with occasional nods to preferences, which are still
treated as inherent and static properties of authors.21
Anne Barron has recently called attention to the bizarre consequences of treating creative motivation as exogenous in copyright
specifically.22 In economic theory, the meaning of the resulting
works is irrelevant:
[T]he writer who churns out formulaic potboilers for no other
reason than to pay her rent is indistinguishable—qua economic
actor—from the journalist who seeks through her works to
enrich political debate, the scholar who advances a theory in the
hope of convincing others of its explanatory power, or the poet
who endeavours through words to transfigure others’ imaginative horizons.23

The scientist might have been a journalist, if only her internal
utility calculus and/or the relative rewards from the two fields
differed enough. But the actors in this story are unrecognizable as
people.24 Creativity, as lived, is more than a response to incentives,
working from fixed and random preferences. Copyright law has good
reasons to shy away from judging artistic merit (though eschewing
not have commercial interest as their primary motivating force, and so propertization of their
work is irrelevant to their production of innovative material. But more than this,
propertization may be inconsistent with their continued creativity and so may not just be
irrelevant but actively inimical to the development of this modality of production.”).
21. Another variant comes from Greg Lastowka, who argues that the desire for fame is
a primary incentive for creativity. See Greg Lastowka, The Trademark Function of
Authorship, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1171, 1177 & n.25 (2005). Lastowka also credits the pure
enjoyment of creative production as a key motivation, but perhaps because he is focused on
policy levers that seem unlikely to affect that enjoyment, he does not spend much time
analyzing it. See Lastowka, Digital Attribution, supra note 18, at 58 n.95. Creativity is thus
figured as the purchase of a lottery ticket, with the hope of a payoff in fortune or fame. Like
the monetary-incentives account, the fame-seeking story has difficulty explaining why
classical composers don’t all switch over to rap or country music, and why poets are not
clamoring to join the casts of reality shows.
22. Anne Barron, Copyright Infringement, ‘Free-Riding’ and the Lifeworld, (London Sch.
of Econ. & Pol. Sci, Law, Soc’y & Econ., Working Paper No. 17, 2008), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=1280893.
23. Id. at 8.
24. The copyright literature is starting to recognize this point, at least for creators who
are not participating in the money economy. See, e.g., Quiggin & Hunter, supra note 20, at 220
(“Amateur content producers are emphatically not just utility maximizers who will start
making widgets if the return on investment for widgets is better than the return on
investment for producing content.”).
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aesthetic theory is often an impossible project),25 but copyright’s
formal indifference to content has mistakenly been coupled with
indifference to process: to the reasons creators produce new works
and the methods they use. This is where incentive theory breaks
down. The next section explores how creators think and talk about
their own creativity in ways that contrast sharply with the incentive
story.
II. AUTHORS ON AUTHORSHIP: THE ECSTASY OF INFLUENCE
A. Beyond Preferences: Compulsion, Love, and Other Narratives of
Creativity
Many standard experiences of creativity simply do not fit into the
incentive model, whether the incentives are measured in money or
in reputation. Incentives require audiences—if no one is reading,
neither payment nor credit will be forthcoming—and yet much
creativity exists without any external audience.26 As professors used
to too-silent classrooms, academics may forget that, in the absence
of sanctions at least, it is usually much harder to get people to stop
talking than to get them to start.
Margaret Atwood, the well-known Canadian novelist, begins a
volume on writing with various quotations, including one from
Mavis Gallant that emphasizes the irrationality of creativity:
I still do not know what impels anyone sound of mind to leave
dry land and spend a lifetime describing people who do not exist.
If it is child’s play, an extension of make believe ... how to
account for the overriding wish to do that, just that, only that,
and consider it as rational an occupation as riding a bicycle over
the Alps?27

25. See Alfred C. Yen, Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 247
(1998).
26. One could call internal satisfaction a type of incentive, but unless one has an account
of how external forces might change the magnitude of that internal motivation, incentive
would collapse into preference. The point of incentive theory is that it offers levers by which
to affect behavior, given preferences.
27. MAVIS GALLANT, THE SELECTED STORIES OF MAVIS GALLANT, at x (1996), quoted in
MARGARET ATWOOD, NEGOTIATING WITH THE DEAD: A WRITER ON WRITING, at xiii (2002).
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Atwood then collects a series of over seventy answers to the question of why writers write.28 Only two include “[t]o make money”;29
the others, while more varied, regularly invoke notions of compulsion, overflowing desire, and other excesses:
Because I knew I had to keep writing or else I would die.... To
please myself.... To thumb my nose at Death.... Because to create
is human. Because to create is Godlike.... To attract the love of
a beautiful woman.... To thwart my parents. To spin a fascinating tale. To amuse and please the reader. To amuse and please
myself.... Graphomania. Compulsive loghorrhea. Because I was
driven to it by some force outside my control. Because I was
possessed. Because an angel dictated to me. Because I fell into
the embrace of the Muse. Because I got pregnant by the Muse
and needed to give birth to a book.... To act out antisocial
behavior for which I would have been punished in real life....
Because the story took hold of me and wouldn’t let me go.... To

28. MARGARET ATWOOD, NEGOTIATING WITH THE DEAD: A WRITER ON WRITING, at xx-xxii.
Atwood is no enemy of the profit (or sustenance) motive; she devotes a chapter to the
complicated and necessary relationship between art and commerce, recognizing that writers
need to sustain themselves somehow, and that means participating in economic life one way
or another, whether it is marrying wealth, attracting a patron, or earning advances. See id.
at 61-90.
29. Id. at xx. Writing “original” fiction is generally a risky way to make money, since most
writers are commercially unsuccessful. Regardless, it is still common for writers to want to
sell their work along with getting their revenge. Even when direct commercialization is
entirely out of reach for a type of creative practice, creators regularly have varying motives.
Writing about the practice of creating freely shared “mods” for videogames, Braxton Soderman
summarizes:
Many of the articles about game mods also contemplate the reasons why
modders produce their works: for the fun of it, for reputation and ego boosts, for
experience that might allow them to find employment within the gaming
industry, for the connections and community that such productions offer, or for
a form of artistic expression and sense of “owning” their work .... Although
clearly some modders are motivated by extrinsic rewards ... it is often pointed
out that many modders are motivated by deeper, intrinsic motivations. For
example, Neil Rodrigues, a project manager for the company that created [the
free online game] The Silver Lining, explains that volunteer workers find
motivation in personal, internal sources: “[S]ince you’re not getting paid to work,
you must have an internal passion to enjoy what you do.”
Braxton Soderman, Intrinsic Motivation: flOw, Video Games, and Participatory Culture, 2
TRANSFORMATIVE WORKS AND CULTURES (2009), http://journal.transformativeworks.org/
index.php/twc/article/view/97/87.
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cope with my depression.... To make a name that would survive
death.... To give back something of what has been given to me.30

Some of these reasons are pleasant, some are unpleasant, even
destructive. They are not the products of conscious choice or rational
weighing of utilities. “The blood jet is poetry,” Sylvia Plath wrote,
“[t]here is no stopping it.”31 Days later, she killed herself.32 As for
Atwood’s account of her own genesis as a writer, it has the feel of a
lightning strike:
It simply happened, suddenly, in 1956, while I was crossing the
football field on the way home from school. I wrote a poem in my
head and then I wrote it down, and after that writing was the
only thing I wanted to do. I didn’t know that this poem of mine
wasn’t at all good, and if I had known, I probably wouldn’t have
cared. It wasn’t the result but the experience that had hooked
me: it was the electricity.33

Novelist Anne Lamott’s realization came in elementary school
when her writing was published as part of a school competition: “I
understood immediately the thrill of seeing oneself in print. It
provides some sort of primal verification: you are in print; therefore
you exist.”34 Later, Lamott addresses the question “why do people
write?” directly:
Interviewers ask famous writers why they write, and it was ...
the poet John Ashbery who answered, “Because I want to.”
Flannery O’Connor answered, “Because I’m good at it,” and
when the occasional interviewer asks me, I quote them both.
Then I add that other than writing, I am completely unemployable. But really, secretly, when I’m not being smart-alecky, it’s
because I want to and I’m good at it.35

30. ATWOOD, supra note 28, at xx-xxii.
31. Sylvia Plath, Kindness, in ARIEL 78 (1965); see also LEWIS HYDE, THE GIFT:
IMAGINATION AND THE EROTIC LIFE OF PROPERTY 146 (1983) (“[T]he artist often feels
compelled, feels the desire, to make the work and offer it to an audience.”).
32. Kate Kellaway, The Poet Who Died So Well: The Real Sylvia Plath, THE OBSERVER,
Mar. 19, 2000, at 21.
33. ATWOOD, supra note 28, at 14.
34. ANNE LAMOTT, BIRD BY BIRD: SOME INSTRUCTIONS ON WRITING AND LIFE, at xiv (1994).
35. Id. at xxviii.
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Many people contribute to open source projects and other online
endeavors for the same reason: to make a mark,36 whether or not
that mark is acknowledged by others. Margaret Atwood’s experience
of disturbing the universe came as self-recognition, before she had
even shared her poem with anyone else.
For Lamott and the writers she knows, writing is often difficult,
and certainly not a good way of earning a living, though very few
aspiring writers want to hear just how bad a way it is.37 According
to Lamott, writing a felt truth “is a little like milking a cow: the
milk is so rich and delicious, and the cow is so glad you did it.”38
Contrary to the Lockean vision of difficult labor, which people only
do to avoid starving, engaging in creative labor is not a task in need
of external incentives. Using another telling comparison, Stephen
King claims that “[t]he writer who is serious and committed is
incapable of sizing up story material the way an investor might size
up stock offerings, picking out the ones which seem likely to provide
a good return.”39 And yet, when it works well, writing is so rewarding that all the sacrifices are worth it (and these economic terms are
not accidental, even though creators are not referring to incentives).
Jorge Luis Borges, in his short story Borges and I, appeals not to
divinity or compulsion but to doubleness: Borges the writer is not
Borges the person; the person tried to escape the writer once, but no
longer.40 Borges’s playful approach demonstrates yet another version of the nonrationality of creation. Borges the author may have
36. CLAY SHIRKY, HERE COMES EVERYBODY: THE POWER OF ORGANIZING WITHOUT
ORGANIZATIONS 132 (2008) (stating that people contribute to Wikipedia and other
noncommercial projects for “a chance to exercise some unused mental capacities” and out of
“vanity—the ‘Kilroy was here’ pleasure of changing something in the world, just to see my
imprint on it. Making a mark on the world is a common human desire”).
37. LAMOTT, supra note 34, at xxx.
38. Id. at xxxi; see also id. at 202-03 (“You are going to have to give and give and give, or
there’s no reason for you to be writing.... [Y]ou are going to have to go on giving, and the
giving is going to have to be its own reward.”); id. at 216 (“Even though so much of my writing
time is stressful and disheartening, I carry a secret sense of accomplishment around with
me.... But you pay through the nose for this.”).
39. STEPHEN KING, ON WRITING: A MEMOIR OF THE CRAFT 159 (2000).
40. Jorge Luis Borges, Borges and I, in LABYRINTHS (James E. Irby trans., 1964), available
at http://www.amherstlecture.org/perry2007/Borges%20and%20I.pdf (“I recognize myself less
in his books than in many others or in the laborious strumming of a guitar. Years ago I tried
to free myself from him and went from the mythologies of the suburbs to the games with time
and infinity, but those games belong to Borges now and I shall have to imagine other things.
Thus my life is a flight and I lose everything and everything belongs to oblivion, or to him.”).
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preferences, but they are not the preferences of Borges the person,
and so to maximize the utility of one is not necessarily to maximize
the utility of the other.
Roberta Kwall, who argues for enhanced moral rights for creators
(as against the claims of publishers and of audiences), documents
that many creators experience creativity as inspiration.41 It feels as
if the source of the work is at least in part external, guided but not
controlled by the artist’s hand.42 Whereas Kwall emphasizes the
extent to which creation narratives parallel the Creation narrative—the author is an instrument of God, and the resulting work
is at least partly owed to God—I will speak more of compulsion and
nonrational calculation. Kwall’s narratives are consistent with my
account, however; creators routinely do not think of themselves as
controlling their own output.43 Creativity is often experienced as an
autonomic function, like making antibodies. People create as a
function of their humanity; people who can’t think of themselves as
creators are damaged.44
Or more positively: creativity routinely feels good. It brings the
creator pleasure, and, if she’s lucky, brings others pleasure as well.
When we talk about pleasure (and agony) instead of utility, we get
closer to the lived experience of creativity,45 and are in a better
position to understand exactly how resistant or compliant creative
practices are likely to be in response to the constraints and possibili41. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation: The Intrinsic Dimension of the
Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945, 1995-98 (2006).
42. Id. at 1947.
43. See id. at 1961 (discussing Madeline L’Engle’s account of how artists are subjected to
their works); id. at 1965-68 (quoting and citing numerous authors, from philosophers to
composers to painters to poets to novelists, on the futility of trying to control the creative
process and the way in which a work seems to be produced by forces outside the author’s
control).
44. “If somebody doesn’t create something, however small it may be, he gets sick. An awful
lot of people feel that they’re treading water—that if they vanished in smoke, it wouldn’t
mean anything at all in this world. And that’s a despairing and destructive feeling. It’ll kill
you.” Arthur Miller, What I’ve Learned, ESQUIRE, July 2003, at 110 (interviewed by John H.
Richardson), quoted in Martin Skladany, Alienation by Copyright: Abolishing Copyright to
Spur Individual Creativity, 55 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 361, 362 (2008).
45. This experience goes from high culture to low, from famous authors to unsung artists.
See MICHAEL CHABON, MAPS AND LEGENDS: READING AND WRITING ALONG THE BORDERLANDS
14 (2008); Deborah Halbert, Intellectual Property in the World of Quilting (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author) (discussing quilters’ motivations, which focus on the
pleasures of making something creative and of sharing that work with others).
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ties of copyright law. One thing that jumps out from artists’ own
stories is the importance of process as well as result. The law
assesses creative output—works—for originality and other features.
There are good reasons for the law to take the work as the proper
object of scrutiny. But these artistic self-reports are also, and often
overwhelmingly, about creation the verb rather than creation the
noun. Inspiration and motivation are dynamic. A copyright law
directed only at static products will make mistakes about how to
foster progress.
B. The Women Who Love Too Much: Leaving the Market Behind
Once we see creativity as more than a response to an external
incentive, we can assess copyright’s effects on individual creators
as they respond to the world they see, which is already saturated
with copyrighted works. This Section investigates fanworks—works
created outside the major content industries by aficionados of a
source text: the further adventures of Sherlock Holmes, or Han Solo,
or Wonder Woman. If you have ever imagined what happened after
Return of the Jedi, or wondered what would have happened if
Superman was a supervillain facing off against Batman, you have
begun to construct a fanwork. Fanworks can be essays, stories, art,
videos, songs, or any other form of art. With limited exceptions, they
circulate outside the money economy, shared freely with other fans.
In much of media fandom, fanworks are mainly produced by women,
contributing to their status as outsider art.46
Fanworks exist because creativity arises out of a sense of play.
Play can be serious and intense, or relaxed, but mainly play is
unpredictable.47 Play is about possibilities, not all of which can be
realized in any one text. Audiences then respond to one author’s
creativity with their own, as Michael Chabon explains:
All enduring popular literature has this open-ended quality, and
extends this invitation to the reader to continue, on his or her
46. Gender and Fan Studies (Round Five, Part One): Geoffrey Long and Catherine
Tosenberger (July 1, 2007), http://www.convergenceculture.org/weblog/2007/07/gender_and_
fan_studies_round_f.php.
47. See Cohen, supra note 3, at 1190-92 (arguing that the unpredictability inherent in
creative play is a reason to limit copyright’s scope, to avoid suppressing new creations).
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own, with the adventure.... [I]t creates a sense of an infinite
horizon of play, an endless game board; it spawns, without
trying, a thousand sequels, diagrams, and Web sites.... Through
parody and pastiche, allusion and homage, retelling and
reimagining the stories that were told before us and that we
have come of age loving—amateurs—we proceed, seeking out the
blank places in the map that our favorite writers, in their
greatness and negligence, have left for us, hoping to pass on to
our own readers—should we be lucky enough to find any—some
of the pleasure that we ourselves have taken in the stuff we love:
to get in on the game. All novels are sequels; influence is bliss.48

But in the modern era, sequels are derivative works, and
derivative works are supposedly, by default, in the control of the
copyright owner.49 Chabon obviously means something different by
“sequel” than the Copyright Act,50 but the fact that there is no
bright line between something that is a derivative work and
something that is not points to a major breakdown between creative
practice and copyright theory. Creativity serves its humanizing
functions without regard to whether the author is making what
would currently be deemed a derivative work.
As a result, copyright theorists have been quite interested in fanworks as evidence of creative practices that exist without, and even
in contradiction to, copyright’s official incentive story. Doctrinally,
the position that fanworks do not infringe copyright owners’ rights
is usually framed as a claim of fair use. Even outside of fan studies,
copyright low-protectionists regularly point to fan fiction—and its
most studied subset, slash, which involves romantic and/or sexual
relationships between two characters of the same sex51—as a classic
fair use.52 Fan fiction typically has many features that favor a
48. CHABON, supra note 45, at 56-57.
49. See, e.g., MicroStar v. Formgen Inc. 154 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 1998) (“A copyright
owner holds the right to create sequels.”).
50. For definition of a “derivative work” see 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
51. Sonia K. Katyal, Performance, Property, and the Slashing of Gender in Fan Fiction,
14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 461, 505-06 (2006). Some uses limit “slash” to male/male
relationships, preferring “femslash” to specifically designate female/female relationships.
52. E.g., Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, Everyone’s a Superhero: A Cultural Theory
of “Mary Sue” Fan Fiction as Fair Use, 95 CAL. L. REV. 597 (2007); Katyal, supra note 51, at
505-06; Hannibal Travis, Of Blogs, eBooks, and Broadband: Access to Digital Media as a First
Amendment Right, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1519, 1547-48, 1555 (2007) (using fan fiction as a key
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finding of fair use. Fan fiction is usually noncommercial (though
there are physical zines sold for money, even occasionally for profit),
usually transformative (though there are works that do not add
much to the original in the eyes of anyone except the fan creator),
and usually not the type of work that competes with the copyright
owner’s markets (though there are works that could be licensed tieins). But fan fiction, especially slash, persists as a marquee fair use
for deeper reasons.
Slash works as a metonym for transformative fair use because it
is about nonrivalrous pleasures.53 As Francesca Coppa has said in
conversation, slash allows artists to answer the question “[d]o I
want to be him or do I want to have him?” with, “[b]oth, of course.”54
Fans like Captain Kirk and Mr. Spock, so they put them together.
In fanworks, the two of them can find each other for the first time
an infinite number of times, in an infinite number of ways: they can
meet as children; they can fall in love slowly over the course of the
first five-year mission; they can have a torrid affair that ends badly;
they can have a torrid affair that never ends.
Imagination is a renewable resource. Fan creators, realizing this,
reject the economy of scarcity and excludability that animates
mainstream copyright discourse:
[W]e have the ability to keep changing our characters and giving
them new life over and over. We can kill and resurrect them as
often as we like.... We can give them an infinite, always changing life rather than the single life of their original creation. We

example of free speech threatened by expansive copyright rights).
53. Sonia Katyal argues that slash, by queering characters whose sexualities in canon are
default heterosexual, subverts notions of the authenticity or singularity of any given text in
the same way that it subverts notions of fixed sexual identity. See Katyal, supra note 51, at
492-93. Her argument is consistent with mine, but I am more interested in the way that slash
focuses on pleasure—the pleasure of the characters, the pleasure of the authors, the pleasure
of the readers. It is pleasure as well as felt necessity that drives the challenges to dominant
sexuality that Katyal sees in slash.
54. My argument is about slash as metonym, not slash as unique. Any given person can
have the same reaction to specific characters and situations regardless of sexuality. Slash is
an exemplar of the category “fair use,” but that doesn’t make slash any better, even as fair use,
than nonslash, any more than a robin is a better bird than an ostrich. The robin is just more
easily recognized as a category member. See generally GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND
DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND (1987).
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have given ourselves license to do whatever we want and it’s
very liberating.55

Fan writers get to have their stories and then wipe the slate clean
and start over again, perhaps influenced, but not bound, by previous
stories: they have their cake and eat it too. In the fannish economy,
that’s what cake is for.56 Real cake is unfortunately rivalrous, but
characters, stories, and plots aren’t.
In particular, characters, unlike real people, are unkillable.
Good characters inspire sequels, authorized and not, and become
“exhilarating monsters, free (it seems at first) from ordinary moral
considerations, free even from the laws of nature and common
sense.”57 Characters like Tamburlaine and Falstaff (not to mention
Hannibal Lecter) respect no boundaries: “There seems no reason
why [they] should ever stop.”58 This is part of the nature of being a
character instead of a person: “At the level of performance, all
deaths are as fake as [Falstaff’s].”59 Hamlet dies, and the next night
he bounds onto the stage again, mourning his father. If theater
seems like special pleading, consider other resurrections: Sherlock
Holmes returns to life after he dies, so does Spock (now for a second
time as the original Star Trek series is remade with new actors);60
55. Shoshanna Green et al., “Normal Female Interest in Men Bonking”: Selections from
the Terra Nostra Underground and Strange Bedfellows, in THEORIZING FANDOM 9, 35 (Cheryl
Harris & Alison Alexander eds., 1998) (quoting K. Bannister, May 1993).
56. Again, I’ve borrowed Coppa’s excellent words. See also HYDE, supra note 31, at 21 (“In
the world of gift, as in [a fairy tale on the theme of charity to a stranger being rewarded], you
not only can have your cake and eat it too, you can’t have your cake unless you eat it.”).
57. Alexander Leggatt, Killing the Hero: Tamburlaine and Falstaff, in PART TWO:
REFLECTIONS ON THE SEQUEL 53, 55 (Paul Budra & Betty A. Schellenberg eds., 1998).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 56.
60. In fact, the recent Star Trek feature film might be thought to star the third set of
actors to portray the classic characters, since a major fan film production has also offered liveaction versions of Kirk, Spock, and the rest of the crew. See Star Trek: Phase II, http://
www.startreknewvoyages.com/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2009). This fan production features,
among other things, performances by Walter Koenig (the original Pavel Chekov), George
Takei (Hikaru Sulu), Denise Crosby (Star Trek: The Next Generation’s Tasha Yar), and Majel
Barrett Rodenberry (several key Star Trek and Next Generation roles, and creator Gene
Rodenberry’s widow), and scripts by Star Trek writers D.C. Fontana and David Gerrold
(whose writing credits include the classic Star Trek episode The Trouble with Tribbles). Id.
at http://www.startreknewvoyages.com/cast_crew.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2009). In other
words, these people so loved Star Trek that they did not stop making it when they could no
longer get paid; when they had a chance to work with other people who loved the show as
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James Bond survives multiple decades, multiple actors, and
multiple shifts in societal mores, all of which could have proved
more deadly than any supervillain. David Brewer explained how
multiplication of copies and performances made clear that no one
appearance of a character necessarily competed with or altered
another:
Falstaff was no more (or less) present in any [single performance
or copy of Shakespeare’s play,] but by virtue of those hundreds
of performances and tends of thousands of printed copies—not
to mention his additional iteration in texts like Shakespeare’s
Jubilee—he could seem exempt from the ordinary laws of
physics .... As such, he could be envisioned as ultimately
inexhaustible: one cannot wear out a “sprite” capable of appearing in thousands of places at the same time any more than one
can deplete an “immortal spirit” by conjuring it up yet another
time.
If characters were unconstrained by “mortal law,” then they
could also be regarded as perpetually available through what
Simon Stern has usefully termed an “economy of abundance.”61

Fanworks take this infinite extensibility to its logical conclusion.
Each person can write her own version of the story, and thus there
are no contradictions in the stories, only variations.62
But why? Why would fans spends so much time, energy, and even
money on endeavors that cannot bring monetary return, and often
invite scorn from outsiders? Working with the basic assumption that
much as they did, they volunteered their creative talents.
61. DAVID A. BREWER, THE AFTERLIFE OF CHARACTER, 1726-1825, at 11 (2005). Brewer
considers the economy of abundance a useful fantasy, juxtaposed to the “equally far-fetched”
economy of scarcity posited by booksellers. Id. The utility of these fantasies, however, varies
for different tasks; the present problem is that law sees the economy of scarcity everywhere.
See id. at 203 (“One of the principal goals of this study has been to show how our current ways
of thinking about characters as participants in an economy of scarcity have not always been
as dominant or as seemingly self-evident as they are today. The corollary which emerges from
this inquiry, of course, is that these ways of thinking need not (and, to my mind, should not)
continue indefinitely. I thus find it heartening to see the glimmerings of a genuine if perhaps
necessarily limited alternative to the economy of scarcity, one in which certain characters, at
least, can operate in something approximating the economy of abundance.”).
62. See id. at 18 (noting class and educational implications of popular reinterpretations
in producing “an equitable distribution of cultural capital,” part and parcel of an economy of
abundance).
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commercialization is impossible, fan authors are free to ignore
copyright’s incentive story and create for all the other reasons that
people create. As Clive Young writes about fan filmmakers,
[For many people, making a fan film is] a stepping stone to
reawakening their creativity, opening up the door to a whole
side of themselves that may not have seen the light of day in
some time. Kids are encouraged to be creative—then they grow
up a bit and society recommends that they cut it out, fall in line,
get it together, act their age, and make some money. Ironically,
the money part is what causes many people to start making fan
films—because without disposable income, how would they buy
the equipment?63

The money is flowing the wrong way: people pay to play.
Fan authors’ explanations for why they do what they do look a lot
like the explanations given by authors who participate in the
commercial sector. To take a particularly notable example, one
commercially successful fantasy author, Steven Brust, wrote an
unauthorized novel starring characters from the TV series/movie
Firefly/Serenity.64 He wrote My Own Kind of Freedom, and released
it under a Creative Commons license, because—in his own
words—he “couldn’t help [him]self.”65 Brust’s experience is just one
example of what Wendy Gordon argues is a common phenomenon:
because creators begin with what they know, and because what they
know in modern times often comes from private, copyrighted
sources, creators may feel that they have no choice but to respond

63. CLIVE YOUNG, HOMEMADE HOLLYWOOD: FANS BEHIND THE CAMERA 261 (2008).
64. STEVEN BRUST, MY OWN KIND OF FREEDOM: A FIREFLY NOVEL (2007), available at
http://dreamcafe.com/firefly.html.
65. Webmaster, Steven Brust Unofficial “Firefly” Novel—Serenitystuff.com Review (May
29, 2006), http://www.whedon.info/article.php3?id_article=15938.
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to existing works.66 Their minds have been colonized, and only
reworking can free them.
The history of one large slash fandom illustrates these creative
dynamics: the sense of compulsion and the overwhelming passion
that fan authors experience echo the accounts of the “pro” creators
canvassed in the previous section, even though fan authors are
excluded from the mainstream market. Legacy, a five-volume selfpublished zine reviewing the history of Kirk/Spock slash since Star
Trek first aired in the 1960s, contains a number of first-person
accounts of what it was like to discover, read, and write slash.67
Excessiveness and plenitude are repeated themes, contrasting with
the economic model of incentives predicated on scarcity.
Killa, for example, describes “complete distraction,” stories
“burning up my brain,” being “desperately in love with my story,”
having “no perspective,” and feeling “like falling in love at fifteen.
Dizzy, heady, totally insane.”68 Addiction metaphors, with their
implication of the erasure of a cost-benefit analysis, also play a role.
“‘Forget whiskey,’ says Greywolf, ‘forget sex, cocaine and chocolate;
writing is the best fucking drug in the universe!’”69 Professional and
fan fiction writer Elizabeth Bear makes a similar comparison
between sex and creation:

66. See Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and
Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1569 (1993)
(“Some poems, some ideas, some works of art, become ‘part of me’ in such a way that if I
cannot use them, I feel I am cut off from part of myself. I would prefer never to have been
exposed to them rather than to experience that sort of alienation.”) (citation omitted). Gordon
quotes J.S.G. Boggs:
Creative people are prisoners. That is to say that they get “captivated,” and the
only way out is to beat a path away from the point of captivity. If my attention
is “captured,” it is impossible to simply get away. The bars are not physical.
They are produced by the intellectual, the emotional, or, more usually, a
combination of the two. But, they are as functional as any jail cell you will ever
construct in the material world.
J.S.G. Boggs, Who Owns This?, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 889, 889 (1993), quoted in Gordon, supra
at 1570; see also KING, supra note 39, at 159 (arguing that writers do not control their own
material).
67. See Legacy: Celebrating the 30th Anniversary of Kirk/Spock Fiction, http://liquidfic.
net/legacyflyer.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2009).
68. Lyrastar, The Source of The Mississippi: What Was First?, in 1 LEGACY 144, 145-46
(Beyond Dreams Press, 2007).
69. Lyrastar, Online K/S Fiction, in 1 LEGACY 148 (Beyond Dreams Press, 2007)
[hereinafter Lyrastar, Online K/S Fiction].
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We are pattern-finding and story-telling animals. It’s what we
do. We take the real world and turn it into narratives and
symbols so our brains can manipulate them more easily. And
once we have those narrative symbols, if they suit our needs, we
don’t stop manipulating them just because somebody says, “well,
you shouldn’t do that because it’s nasty.” Any more than, you
know, the vast majority of people ever stopped wanking because
somebody told them it would make them go blind.70

Here is an extended description of the process by which a reader
became a writer, following a typical trajectory:
I read online K/S [Kirk/Spock slash] insatiably. It almost didn’t
matter to me at first if the story were poorly written or if it were
exquisitely crafted: I was so enraptured, so captivated by the
wild, glorious terrain of my new world that I couldn’t look upon
any of it with dispassionate eyes. I devoured everything K/S that
I could find on the Internet. When I wasn’t reading K/S, I was
thinking about it. I thought about it when I drove to work. I
thought about it when I grocery shopped. I thought about it
when I was elated, when I was bored, when I was peevish and
when I was serene.
Most of all, I thought about it in bed at night.
In the dark, I’d mentally replay my favorite scenes from the
K/S writers’ stories. I’d often embellish them to better suit my
own fantasies, and occasionally I’d squish parts of two different
stories together to create something different. I’d conjure up bits
of dialogue I’d read and work the words around in my head. If
the writer’s words didn’t quite ring true, then I’d rearrange them
until they were more convincing, more real in terms of what I
thought I knew about the characters.
One night when I was giving up several hours of sleep to do
all this, it suddenly occurred to me that the scene I was envisioning and the words I were hearing were not from anyone else’s
story. They were mine—all mine. And ... they weren’t half bad.71

70. Elizabeth Bear, Column: Bears Examining #4, http://subterraneanpress.com/index.
php/magazine/summer-2007/column-bears-examining-4-by-elizabeth-bear (last visited Oct.
26, 2009).
71. Jesmihr: The Journey of One Author to K/S, in 3 LEGACY 48, 49-50 (Beyond Dreams
Press, 2007).
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The intensity of this experience is standard for many creators. Like
fan authors, computer programmers use the language of addiction
when explaining why they participate in open source projects. Chris
Hanson, a Principal Research Scientist at MIT and a maintainer in
the Debian Linux community, stated: “Creation is unbelievably
addictive. And programming, at least for skilled programmers, is
highly creative. So good programmers are compelled to program to
feed the addiction.”72
The Internet made these features of creativity more salient and
visible, converting the flexibility and extensibility of stories into a
flexibility of text. When the physical inputs to creativity are so
cheap as to nearly be free, the underlying noneconomic motivations
can push the resulting works in new directions:
“Beside the Wells” was also the first K/S story online to play
with some of the fluidity of electronic publishing, the ability to
make changes to the online work. A few months after posting the
story, says [the author], she thought of a clever ending she liked,
though perhaps not so much as the first. But what the heck? It
wasn’t like there would be a stack of zines to waste and reprint.
She posted it to the newsgroup as a “Version 2[.”] Now readers
have both: one story, two endings.73

And because fanworks in their inception are based on the original,
the ability to have more and more without erasing the original
structures the entire enterprise. One popular fan story form is
known as “Five Things That Never Happened.” A “Five Things”
story is fanwork that sets forth five alternate realities, each usually
incompatible with one another.74 In the first, Kal-El (Superman)
may be raised by the government instead of Jonathan and Martha
Kent; in the second, Superman may be a villain; in the third,
Superman may marry Lana Lang; in the fourth, he may be in love
with Lex Luthor; and in the fifth, he may survive the end of the
world and seek out a new planet to protect. The fanwork corpus as
a whole contains multiple incompatible possible stories, and in a
72. ERIC VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION 124 (2005), available at http://web.mit.
edu/evhippel/www/democ1.htm.
73. Lyrastar, Online K/S Fiction, supra note 69, at 147-48.
74. See, e.g., Five Things That Never Happened, http://community.livejournal.com/
5_nevers (last visited Oct. 22, 2009).
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“Five Things” story one single author explicitly engages with that
multiplicity and celebrates it.
Fanworks foreground their embeddedness in a web of other,
related works: a story is not a single economic entity, neatly divisible from the rest of the world’s creative output, but is inextricably intertwined with other stories. As one fan wrote, “[T]he thing
about ‘transformative’ work, whether it overshadows or not the
original? Does it really matter? The important thing is that we’ll
be able to see both, compare, have more.”75 As fans recognize, this
logic is incompatible with the incentive-based, ownership-focused
theories underlying current copyright law, which attempts to occupy
the field of creativity. In transformative work “[t]here’s no subtraction, only multiplication. Copyright law, as it stands now, doesn’t
seek to add, subtract or multiply. Only DIVIDE.”76
Neither cultural disrespect nor fear of aggressive copyright
enforcement has deterred fans from creating fanworks. The language of preference comes closer than the incentive story to explaining this otherwise puzzling persistence, except that satisfying the
preference changes the intensity of the preference. The desire to
speak is a self-renewing, self-reinforcing desire that gets bigger the
more it gives.77 No wonder the dismal science can’t find it.78

75. Posting of not_sally to http://sockkpuppett.livejournal.com/472559.html (Dec. 13, 2007,
10:26 UTC).
76. Posting of Sockkpuppett to http://sockpuppett.livejournal.com/472559.html (Dec. 13,
2007, 10:32 UTC). As this discussion indicates, fan experiences of creativity are also
incompatible with control-based theories of copyright positing that authors’ personalities are
harmed by unauthorized uses. Here, however, I wish to focus on the contrast with the
economic theory dominant in U.S. law.
77. See HYDE, supra note 31, at 22 (“Gift exchange and erotic life are connected in this
regard. The gift is an emanation of Eros ... libido is not lost when it is given away.”); id. at 23
(“[P]eople who live in voluntary poverty or who are not capital-intensive do have more ready
access to erotic forms of exchange that are neither exhausting nor exhaustible and whose use
assures their plenty.”); id. at 146 (“So long as the gift is not withheld, the creative spirit will
remain a stranger to the economics of scarcity.... [T]he gift is not used up in use. To have
painted a painting does not empty the vessel out of which the paintings come. On the
contrary, it is the talent which is not in use that is lost or atrophies, and to bestow one of our
creations is the surest way to invoke the next.”).
78. See id. at 155 (“The hegemony of the market can undermine the possibility of gift
exchange ... and the plenitude of the imagination can be lost to the scarcity of logic.”).

2009]

ECONOMIES OF DESIRE

537

III. LAW UNLIKE LOVE: SOME IMPLICATIONS
Julie Cohen has pointed out that the incentive model, in which
copyright is a vital driver of creativity, “justifies drawing firm
distinctions between authors, on the one hand, and consumers,
imitators, and improvers on the other.”79 Once that move has
succeeded, broad rights to control copying, public distribution, and
derivative works follow as night follows day.80 When we recognize
the failure of the incentive account, we can more realistically assess
what copyright has to offer.81 Copyright law, even in its own
economic terms, plays a minor role, and not necessarily a positive
one.82 I will sketch out three ways in which thick descriptions of
creativity should matter to copyright: first, in its basic normative
foundations; second, in its assessment of fair use claims; and third,
in its calibration of the balance between individual creators and
institutions.
A. What We Talk About When We Talk About Creativity
I will begin with the broadest normative claim: creativity is a
positive virtue, not just because of its results but because of how the
process of making meaning contributes to human flourishing. To
date, copyright doctrine has largely treated the inherent good of
79. Cohen, supra note 3, at 1192-93.
80. See id. at 1193.
81. See id. (“Decentering creativity .... tends to suggest a much more modest conception
of the role that copyright plays in stimulating creative processes and practices. Copyright
fulfills some important economic functions ... and therefore plays an important role in
organizing cultural production, but it is hardly ever the direct cause of a representational shift
in creative practice, nor does it appear to play a direct role in motivating much that is normal
science. Scholars who ask how deploying copyright might stimulate creativity (as opposed to
production) are asking the wrong question. Neither creative inspiration nor the creative
outputs that follow from it are so easily engineered.”); Quiggin & Hunter, supra note 20, at
241 (“To the extent that innovation and productive growth arise from activities that are
pursued primarily on the basis [of] non-economic motives, the link between incentives and
outcomes is weakened. This in turn undermines the rationale for policies aimed at sharpening
incentives and ensuring that everyone engaged in the production of goods and services is
exposed to the incentives generated by a competitive market.”).
82. Indeed, we should be more concerned about the jobs the creators would be doing
instead of writing, drawing, etc., given that most artists pay for their creation time out of the
opportunity cost.

538

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:513

creativity as a pure resource. Incentives may be endangered by
improperly configured copyright law, but preferences to create are
not. From that perspective, the idea that creativity is a powerful,
upwelling force might be thought to counter the chilling effect
decried by critics of expansionist copyright. One important website
that collects cease and desist letters and promotes broad views of
fair use is actually called Chilling Effects, suggesting the rhetorical
appeal of the idea that ordinary speakers are being suppressed.83 As
with any lever of power, copyright enables the strong to do as they
will and ensures that the weak do as they must. Yet if the desire to
create is so strong, do we really need to worry about suppressing it?
The easy response is to note that not everyone has the same
tolerance for risk, and we should be concerned about the speakers
who will silence their voices, even if they still have the same ideas,
the same creativity. This is certainly true, but it is not the full story.
Edward Lee has recently argued that the practical tolerance of most
large-scale copyright owners for most user-generated content, at
least the remix variety, creates a “warming” effect: after watching
others create mashup videos, even risk-averse people join in
online.84 I think this is probably right, because local norms are often
more powerful in influencing behavior than vague and usually
misguided theories about what copyright law provides.85 And yet
Lee’s theory is consciously value-neutral. He takes no position on
whether user-generated content ought to be so free as it is in
practice, and suggests that copyright owners might intervene to
change the norms without any suggestion that such acts would be
morally wrongful.86
The accounts of creativity I have offered provide a foundation for
a different argument. Creativity, including remix creativity, is
part of a good life.87 It should be valued for itself, not tolerated.
83. Chilling Effects Clearinghouse, http://www.chillingeffects.org/ (last visited Oct. 22,
2009).
84. Edward Lee, Warming Up to User-Generated Content, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1459, 154445 (2008).
85. Id. at 1545.
86. See id. at 1537-38.
87. See Barton Beebe, Does Judicial Ideology Affect Copyright Fair Use Outcomes?:
Evidence from the Fair Use Case Law, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 517, 522 (2008) (stating that
fair use is part of the conditions that determine “the contours of the private and public
domains of human expression and, in so doing, directly impact our capability for human
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Creativity should be a favorite of the law even if we do not need to
worry about incentives or disincentives (chilling effects). Incentive
stories, because they do not explain creativity, can mislead us about
the value we want to protect. Under the First Amendment, we
protect religious conviction not only, and not even primarily,
because we worry about the chilling effects of religious persecution.
Devout believers have been willing to go to jail and even die for their
causes; they’re hard to chill. We protect religious faith because it’s
so important, and a core wrong of suppression is its disrespect of the
believer.88 Likewise, respect for creativity, and for the possibility
that every person has new meaning to contribute, should be at the
core of our copyright policy. Instead of monetary rewards or even
artistic control of how works are transmitted to others as our
highest value, we should aim for policies that maximize participation—even when that changes the mix of economic winners and
losers. Economic reward and control rights are likely to be part of
the proper balance, but only part.
B. My Own Kind of Freedom
On a more doctrinal level, respecting creativity as a human force
should lead us to think differently about fair use, among other
things, by encouraging us to take account of noncommercial
motivations even in contexts current doctrine sees as commercial.
Joanna Russ, the feminist science fiction writer, suggested that the
“what if” of slash fanfiction was “what if I were free?”89 What would
flourishing”).
88. Seana Shiffrin writes about the harm of insincere speech; insincere silence may be less
damaging, but that doesn’t make it healthy for speech. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, What Is
Really Wrong with Compelled Association?, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 839, 860-62 (2005) (recognizing
the importance and value of sincere speech for First Amendment purposes).
89. EROTIC UNIVERSE, SEXUALITY AND FANTASTIC LITERATURE 253 (Donald Palumbo ed.,
1986). See also a fan quoted in HENRY JENKINS, CONVERGENCE CULTURE: WHERE OLD AND
NEW MEDIA COLLIDE 256 (2006):
What I love about fandom is the freedom we have allowed ourselves to create
and recreate our characters over and over again. Fanfic rarely sits still. It’s like
a living, evolving thing, taking on its own life, one story building on another,
each writer’s reality bouncing off another’s and maybe even melding together to
form a whole new creation.... I find that fandom can be extremely creative
because we have the ability to keep changing our characters and giving them
new life over and over. We can kill and resurrect them as often as we like. We
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I read, what would I write, what relationships would I have with the
external world and with other people? Asking “what if I were free”
is very different from the claim-staking of the rhetoric of opensource software, which focuses on the idea that open-source software
is “free as in free speech, not as in free beer.”90 That common phrase
has always struck me as hiding within it many unexamined and
problematic assumptions about what free is with respect to speech
and how it relates to a commercial marketplace.91 What free is with
respect to women’s voices, of course, has been fiercely debated at
least since John Stuart Mill (and his wife) wrote The Subjection of
Women.92 Slash and other fanworks come from a background of
constraint, where acting as if we were free to write our own versions
is a different kind of act than using our already-extant freedom to
create open-source software instead of proprietary code. Women as
writers have rarely had the luxury of exclusive control to give away.
One aspect of that unfreedom has been an inability to participate
in the money economy on the same terms as men.93 Fanworks
represent an alternative outlet for creative energies. What seems
like a contradiction—though a Freudian might say that contradictions regularly have an underlying logic—is that the works on which
fanworks are based are products of a mass market, incentive-based
economy.94 Nor would formal attempts to create a market for
can change their personalities and how they react to situations. We can take a
character and make him charming and sweet or cold-blooded and cruel. We can
give them an infinite, always-changing life rather than the single life of their
original creation. We have given ourselves license to do whatever we want and
it’s very liberating
90. See GNU Project, The Free Software Definition, http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/freesw.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2009) (“Free software is a matter of liberty, not price. To
understand the concept, you should think of free as in free speech, not as in free beer.”). Both
free beer and free speech, of course, have their dangers. See Edward De Grazia, The
Haymarket Bomb, 18 LAW & LIT. 283, 284 (2006) (“The next day’s New York Times belittled
the incident: it was just ‘a collision’ between policemen and ‘a mob’ of 7,000 or 8,000 anarchist
workmen and tramps—‘maddened with free beer and free speech.’”).
91. One practitioner has suggested that “free puppy” would be another useful comparison,
due to later potential costs of maintaining open-source software. Lori E. Lesser, A Hard Look
at the Tough Issues in Open Source Licenses, 846 PLI/pat 7, 17 (2005).
92. JOHN STUART MILL, THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN (1869).
93. Martha Chamallas, Civil Rights in Ordinary Tort Cases: Race, Gender, and the
Calculation of Economic Loss, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1435, 1466 (2005).
94. See Posting of Cupidsbow to Live Journal, Valuing the Work in Fanwork,
http://cupidsbow.livejournal.com/266405.html (Dec. 15, 2007, 22:42 UTC):
[Non-fans] see all this effort, all the work that goes into fanwork, and they are
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fanworks be a positive change—asserting copyright claims in the
original expression in fanworks would do little if anything to change
the material relations between fanwork creators and mass media
owners.95 Noncommercial creative responses to commodified, mass
media products are ways of reclaiming them for art, and of recognizing the elements in them that surpass market exchange.96
Not unrelatedly, fanworks regularly engage with sexuality of all
kinds. A group of mostly-female creators writes, draws, and makes
video for an audience that is also mostly female, and they are often
turning each other on. This would be dangerous even without the
copyright issues. In fact, the routine presence of sexually explicit
conduct and homosexuality in fanworks has often been a key part
of fair use defenses of fanworks. I, and others, have argued that
so immersed in the invisible reality of capitalist thinking, that they honestly
can't conceptualise that people might genuinely not give a shit about selling that
work for money....
[W]hat I think makes the chasm even harder to bridge is that from the outside,
fandom looks like it is all about consuming—because, in part, that’s exactly what
it is. Consumption is this great paradox that fans wrap their heads around
without too many problems—we have a gift economy, yes, but it is built around
buying primary texts, tie-in merchandise, franchised goods and services. For the
most part we don’t even blink at negotiating these two ideologies; I mean, we
live with multiple realities in our fanfiction every day, so believing a dozen
contradictory things before eating our Star Wars Special Edition Cornflakes is
what we’re trained for....
To the non-fandom side, however, it makes no sense at all. It looks like
hypocrisy, I suspect, rather than living in a multiple-choice culture. Capitalism
talks a good talk about supply and demand, but is too focused on the next big hit
to really mean it: you can have any colour as long as it’s black.
This is why I’ve come around to the idea that valuing something without a
monetary price-tag is one of the most subversive everyday acts now possible in
capitalist culture.
95. To the extent that their contributions in characters and storylines can be separated
out, fanwork creators already automatically have copyright in their works. It just has no
practical effect: very little money would be available to fan authors even if monetization
wouldn’t destroy much of what fans value in their communities, and other kinds of control are
rarely an issue for fanworks.
96. See HYDE, supra note 31, at 158-59 (“The more we allow [commercial] art to define and
control our gifts, the less gifted we will become, as individuals and as a society. The true
commerce of art is a gift exchange, and where that commerce can proceed on its own terms
we shall be heirs to the fruits of gift exchange: in this case, to a creative spirit whose fertility
is not exhausted in use, to the sense of plenitude which is the mark of all erotic exchange, to
a storehouse of works that can serve as agents of transformation, and to a sense of an
inhabitable world.... But none of these fruits will come to us where we have converted our arts
to pure commercial enterprises.”).

542

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:513

fanworks are fair use because of market failure: copyright owners
won’t license homoerotic or sexually explicit versions of their
works.97
The market failure argument, however, is vulnerable to empirical
disproof.98 As Julie Levin Russo has argued, even critical and
“slashy” fan creations can be absorbed by a commercial media
system that is rapidly learning how to profit from user-generated
content. Thus, an official advertisement for the Lord of the Rings
movies presented the films as the epic love story of Frodo and his
boon companion, Sam.99 But, Russo continues, “queer” fan productions have a form as well as a content: fans’ reliance on “subtext”
“implies an open, plural, and dehierarchized model of textuality
wherein diffuse and collective creative labor isn’t easily contained
by top-down intention and authority.”100
Moreover, desire is central to economic life: we have to want
things to work for them and to trade the products of our labor for
them. But because desire is so hard to contain, stories about
desire—whether they’re stories about fans’ desires for their texts, or
stories by fans about characters’ desires for each other—are likely
to be “particularly unruly.”101 It is the audience’s desires that make
media properties valuable, what Russo calls their “libidinal labor.”102
This inherently tugs against claims of central or authorial ownership, since the audience’s investment seems, in Lockean terms, to
co-create the value of the intellectual property.103 Furthermore, the
97. See, e.g., Chander & Sunder, supra note 52, at 621-23; Katyal, supra note 51, at 508;
Rebecca Tushnet, My Fair Ladies: Sex, Gender, and Fair Use in Copyright, 15 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 273, 301-03 (2007).
98. On promiscuous licensing by copyright owners, see Bruce P. Keller & Rebecca
Tushnet, Even More Parodic than the Real Thing: Parody Lawsuits Revisited, 94 TRADEMARK
REP. 979, 995-97.
99. Online Video: Lord of the Rings—Secret Lovers, http://www.tbs.com/broadband/
videoplayer/0,,70636,00.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2009).
100. Gender and Fan Culture (Round Eighteen, Part Two): Julie Levin Russo and Hector
Postigo, Confessions of an Aca-Fan: The Official Weblog of Henry Jenkins, http://www.
henryjenkins.org/2007/10/gender_and_fan_culture_round_e_5.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2009).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Cf. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, We Are Symbols and Inhabit Symbols, So Should We
Be Paying Rent? Deconstructing the Lanham Act and Rights of Publicity, 20 COLUM.-VLA J.L.
& ARTS 123, 125-30 (1996) (making similar claims with respect to trademark value); Jessica
Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising Age, 108 YALE L.J.
1717, 1735 (1996).
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account of creativity as play, as unpredictable and outside authors’
control, illuminates the ways in which a licensing regime will stifle
creative practices even if economic theory only shows a shift of
consumer surplus from licensee to licensor.104
Because slash, and fan fiction generally, are fundamentally based
on the plenitude of imagination, they will be fair use even when
(may the day swiftly come) mainstream copyright owners accept gay
and bisexual characters on the same terms as straight ones and
even when (as is happening right now) copyright owners offer
licenses to all comers as long as those licenses can be withdrawn at
will.
Lydia Loren has recently argued that creators’ intrinsic motives
should be used to calibrate the scope of copyright protection for the
works they create. Among other things, she argues that, when
works would be created without an economic incentive, the scope for
fair use of those works should be greater.105 My argument looks at
a different side of the equation: when copyright’s incentive story
breaks down and people create works that they do not intend to
circulate in the money economy, then claims that such works make
fair uses of existing works should be assessed differently, because
fair use’s economic model fails.
C. The Space Between Us: Intermediaries and Market Logic
Infringement claims, of course, are regularly asserted not only
against individuals but against institutions: publishers, websites,
software providers. Along with the practical reasons for targeting
institutions—their deep pockets, their abilities to act as chokepoints
—scaling up gives the incentive story more ways to avoid talking
about creativity.
The standard economic move in discussions of intrinsic motivations for creativity is to punt to intermediaries/distributors, who are
104. See Cohen, supra note 3, at 1193-94 (“[A] growing body of anecdotal evidence suggests
that copyright’s ‘permission culture’ does exert a substantial constraining influence on
creative practice. Similarly, research in the psychology of creativity suggests that attempts
to impose a rigid structure on the creative process quickly become counterproductive, and that
the success of the creative process hinges in part on the ability to avoid externally imposed
distractions.”) (footnotes omitted).
105. Lydia Pallas Loren, The Pope’s Copyright? Aligning Incentives with Reality by Using
Creative Motivation To Shape Copyright Protection, 69 LA. L. REV. 1, 38-39 (2008).
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supposed to act like perfectly rational actors even if those crazy
artists are unreachable through incentives.106 So the claims about
individual motivation made in the previous section can be brushed
aside if all fair use analysis focuses on YouTube and Viacom. This
is a mistake, as I have argued elsewhere.107 The motivations of the
people uploading their videos to YouTube, and not YouTube’s more
market-disciplined decisions, should guide fair use analysis.
But the distinction between individual creators’ motivations and
those of the institutions that support and live off of them has
broader implications for the structure of copyright and the extent to
which we should regard the current regime as just. Given the
pervasive passion of creators to create, intermediaries, rather than
operating in a classic perfectly competitive market, are essentially
in the position of a proposer in the ultimatum game.
The ultimatum game involves two parties, one of whom can
propose a division of some benefit, usually an amount of money,
and one of whom can accept or decline (the responder).108 If the
responder accepts the offer, the proposed division occurs, but if the
responder rejects the offer, no one gets anything. As a result, a
purely rational responder who understood that the game was not
part of any repeated transaction would accept any offer above zero,
but most people do not behave that way in practice. They are
offended by offers that are too small. Most responders reject offers
that are substantially lower than half, and not being fools themselves, most proposers propose splits that give the responder a
substantial amount.109 However, when participants believe that the
proposer holds the role of proposer for some specific reason, instead
of chance, then proposers offer lower amounts and responders accept
lower amounts, apparently because they conclude that the proposer

106. For a clear summary of this standard argument, see Quiggin & Hunter, supra note
20, at 244-45.
107. See Rebecca Tushnet, User-Generated Discontent: Transformation in Practice, 31
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 497 (2008).
108. See generally Werner Güth et al., An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining,
3 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 367 (1982).
109. See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing
the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1135 (2000)
(“[T]he modal (that is, most common) proposal is for a 50-50 split, and the mean proposal has
been for a 63-37 split.”).
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is, as a matter of justice, entitled to a larger share.110 Because
creators desperately want to create, intermediaries can offer a lower
price, and creators will accept a lower price, than they would if
incentives mattered more.
This creates distributional concerns, and not just for nonmarket
works. Themes of labor exploitation turn up both in discussions of
the mature copyright industries—music,111 television,112 publishing113—and also in discussions of user-generated content.114 The
incentive model, while it has no idea why people create, is also
happily indifferent to questions of justice once people have started
producing: people who don’t need incentives wouldn’t participate if
they didn’t get sufficient psychic benefits from producing. But failure to interrogate tastes should disturb us when it has significant
distributional consequences. How were those tastes for creating
without recompense formed? What are the alternatives? Consider,
as a possible analogy, women’s assumed natural proclivity for
housekeeping and childrearing. We haven’t been thought to need
monetary incentives, because we do it for free, even as economic
structures and social conditions made alternatives hard to find.115
The helplessness creators often feel in the face of their muses is
echoed in helplessness in the face of their limited bargaining power.
But policy can affect bargaining power, probably much more readily
than it can help creators handle their muses. Legislative intervention, as with the termination of transfer provisions that allow
authors to recapture rights in certain works,116 provides some
rebalancing. Copyright law, and general cultural policy, could do
more to direct material rewards to authors if we truly believe that
110. See id.
111. See, e.g., K.J. Greene, Intellectual Property Expansion: The Good, the Bad, and the
Right of Publicity, 11 CHAP. L. REV. 521, 534-35 (2008).
112. See David Carr, Who Won the Writers Strike?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/12/arts/television/12strike.html.
113. See, e.g., Maureen A. O’Rourke, Bargaining in the Shadow of Copyright Law After
Tasini, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 605, 605-06 (2003).
114. See, e.g., Nicholas Carr, Sharecropping the Long Tail, ROUGH TYPE, Dec. 19, 2006,
http://www.roughtype.com/ archives/2006/12/sharecropping_t.php; Posting of Cupidsbow to
Live Journal, How Fanfiction Makes Us Poor, http://cupidsbow.livejournal. com/239587.html
(Apr. 26, 2007, 10:43).
115. See generally Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First Woman’s Rights Claims
Concerning Wives’ Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE L. J. 1073 (1994).
116. See 17 U.S.C. § 203 (2006).

546

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:513

monetary incentives will spur creativity. In addressing the effects
of widely distributed nonmarket production, we need to keep a close
eye on which entities are benefiting materially from all these new
works, and ask whether there are better ways to allocate those
rewards. Assimilation of all creative work to the market is not the
solution to exploitative relations, but neither is blind utopianism.
CONCLUSION
Creativity is messy in ways that copyright law and theory have
often ignored to their detriment. Creators speak of compulsion,
joy, and other emotions and impulses that have little to do with
monetary incentives. Fanworks, distilling all the reasons for
creating that copyright’s incentive theory ignores, foreground desire:
desire for particular characters, desire for certain storylines, desire
for reciprocal gift relationships between authors and audiences.
Desire is of course vital to economic life: we have to want stuff to
work for it. Desire, however, breaks through barriers, and stories
about desire tend to make homo economicus uncomfortable.
Fanworks, as creative endeavors existing outside the money
economy, are fundamentally based on the inexhaustibility of the
imagination. Yet the creative desires fanworks express and satisfy
are not alien to other, marketized creative works. Indeed, creators’
passions are strikingly similar across the boundary between
“original”/authorized and unauthorized derivative works. That
similarity has lessons for copyright’s incentivizing ambitions, as
well as for a broader cultural policy that strives to allow people to
express themselves creatively.

